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Abstract
There exists a large literature which shows that public education is favorable for growth
because it increases the level of human capital and at the same time it tends to produce a
more even income distribution. More egalitarian societies are also associated with less social
conﬂicts and individuals have a lower tendency to report themselves happy when inequality
is high. Therefore it is important to study the reasons of why countries do not adopt and
implement a compulsory and eﬃcient public educational system. It might be that education
is related to social status and therefore the elite might oppose the development of a strong
public education system or any reform that would threat their political power. We show
that one of this social status is the specialization of skilled workers in high-paid jobs and
the abundance of unskilled workers in the production of cheap “home goods” in the market,
such as painting and cleaning a house, babysitting and/or cooking. We emphasize the role
of general equilibrium price adjustments to show that depending on the level of inequality,
the elite might prefer an economy with a positive and “high” cost of education than an
economy where skills are freely provided.
JEL Classiﬁcation: O11; J13
Keywords: Persistent Inequality; Home Goods; Education
“...in the traditional caste system groups in the population were condemned for life, and their
descendants in perpetuity after them, to such task as the cleaning of latrines and the removal
of dead carcasses... Apart from slavery, it is hard to think of system with greater inequality of
opportunity, and the results are also most unequal.”
– Mancur Olson (1982: 156)
1 Introduction
When markets function perfectly inequality reﬂects diﬀerences in innate ability to acquire skills,
to invest in capital, and/or to manage a labor force. This is an eﬃcient inequality. In this case,
wealth, social status, caste, and/or family connections would not aﬀect individual outcomes.
However, as argued by Banerjee (2006), markets do not “work anywhere close to perfect”.
Empirical evidences, for instance, show that credit access and borrowing interest rates depend on
wealth and social status (see Banerjee (2006) for some examples). In human capital investment,
parents cannot borrow against their children’s future income. Consequently, poor individuals
under-invest in both physical and human capital and an ineﬃcient inequality persists over time.1
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1There is no equality of opportunities when wealth and social status aﬀect outcomes.
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This idea is formalized well in a seminal article by Galor and Zeira (1993) who emphasize
the role of credit market imperfections and non-convexity in human capital investment in the
persistence of income inequality. Recent empirical evidences (see Easterly (2005)) have shown
that “inequality does cause underdevelopment.” In the model presented in Galor and Zeira
(1993), for instance, it is straightforward to design a policy to reduce inequality that is Pareto
improving and would also increase development.2 Contrary to the traditional eﬃciency-equity
trade-oﬀ, such policies might increase eﬃciency and improve income distribution. Therefore,
a complementary and important question is: Why countries do not adopt policies to improve
the functioning of their credit market and/or their educational system? We, however, present
a model economy based on Doepke and Zilibotti (2005) to show that, depending on the level of
initial inequality, it is a vested interest of skilled parents to erect barriers to the acquisition of
skills in order to block poor parents to educate their children and keep the price of some home
goods at low levels.
The novel about our result is the following. As in R´ ıos-Rull (1993), there are two diﬀeren-
tiated consumption goods in our economy. One good (good Y ) is produced in the market with
skilled labor only (ex., cars, computers and others). The other one (good Z) can be produced
at home or in the market with both skilled and unskilled labor (ex., babysitting, cleaning a
house, painting a house, and others). Skilled and unskilled agents have similar productivity in
the production of the “home” good. Parents care about the consumption of both goods and
about the average discounted utility of their children. Acquisition of skills is costly and parents
cannot borrow against their children’s future income. When inequality is high, skilled parents
educate their children, specialize in the production of good Y and do not work at home. They
buy good Z in the market. On the other hand, unskilled parents do not educate their children
and do not buy good Z in the market. They instead produce it at home. They will work in the
market and at home. Inequality will therefore persist over time, as in Galor and Zeira (1993).
In addition, we show that depending on the initial inequality, skilled parents might prefer an
economy with a positive and “high” cost of education than an economy where skills are freely
provided.3 If education is freely provided, then unskilled parents will educate their children and
general equilibrium price adjustments implies that future prices of the “home good” (good Z)
will increase and the skill wage premium will decrease. Since parents value the future utility
of their children, the welfare of skilled parents might be reduced. Depending on the political
power of skilled agents, they therefore might block any policy that decreases the cost of skill
acquisition.
This paper is related to two strands of literature. The ﬁrst literature focuses on the in-
tergenerational transmission of inequality and its persistence. It emphasizes the role of credit
market imperfections and some form of non-convexity in human and physical capital investment
to show how inequality persists over time (e.g., Aghion and Bolton (1997), Banerjee and New-
man (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993), and Ray and Strefert (1993)).4 Our analysis complements
this literature by analyzing when it is optimal for some groups of society to block policies and
2Government could issue bonds to ﬁnance education. The debt would be paid by the skilled descendants of
unskilled parents. This policy is Pareto improving as long as the tax paid by these agents are not higher than the
diﬀerence between the skilled and unskilled wages. Alternatively, multilateral agencies might provide ﬁnancial
aids for developing countries to improve their public education systems to institute a free, compulsory education
system or to improve the functioning of the credit market.
3We show that depending on the level of inequality, there is a threshold value of education where unskilled
parents are just indiﬀerent between sending or not their children to school.
4Interestingly, Moav (2005) shows that inequality might be persistent even when the schooling choice is convex.
He diﬀers from the above literature because in his model individual’s productivity as teachers increases with their
own human capital. Another related view emphasizes the tendency of the market mechanism and imperfections
in the credit market to create inequality. Mookherjee and Ray (2002, 2003) show (see also Ljungqvist (1993))
that if several occupations requiring diﬀerent levels of skills are necessary, wages must adjust to force separation
in choices even if all individuals are ex-ante identical. Current individuals will have the same payoﬀs, but since
credit market are imperfect, future generations will have diﬀerent payoﬀs and inequality will persist.Cheap Home Goods and Persistent Inequality 3
institutions that might increase development and decrease inequality. In this respect, Acemoglu
(2005), Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Bourguignon and Verdier (2000), Doepke and Zilibotti
(2005), Grossman and Kim (1999), and Parente and Prescott (1999, 2000) are closest to our
work. They all emphasize the conﬂicts of interest among social classes in the persistence of
high inequality or ineﬃcient technology.5 We diﬀer from this set of papers because we explicitly
consider the role of cheap home goods (i.e., general equilibrium price adjustments) in the per-
sistence of income inequality.6 According to our knowledge we were the ﬁrst to emphasize and
formalize the role of cheap home goods, that can be produced either at home or in the market,
in the persistence of income inequality.7
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 analyzes the
equilibrium and derive the main results. Section 4 presents some possible extensions of our
model economy. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2 The model
The model economy is populated by overlapping generations of agents with diﬀerentiated skill
levels. For simplicity, there are only two skill levels: unskilled and skilled, h ∈ {S,U}. As in
Doepke and Zilibotti (2005), each household consists of one parent and her children, where the
number of children depends on the parent’s earlier fertility decisions. All decisions are made
by adults and they are made sequentially. Soon a parent die, her children become adult. As
soon as they become adult, agents make their fertility decision. There are only two family sizes,
large (grande) and small (petite), n ∈ {G,P}. Then, agents decide on the education of their
children, consumption, and labor supply.8
There are two consumption goods in this economy, Y and Z. Good Y is produced in the
market with skilled labor only. Good Z, on the other hand, can be produced at home or in
the market with both skilled and unskilled labor. Skilled and unskilled agents have similar
productivity in the production technology of good Z. Children might either work at home
(e = 0) or go to school (e = 1). Working children provide l ∈ (0,1) units of unskilled labor at
home. When they become adults working children become unskilled workers, while those that
went to school become skilled workers. There is an education cost φ per child and children that
attend school do not supply any labor.
Production technologies
The production side follows closely R´ ıos-Rull (1993). There are two market technologies in
this economy. We assume that there is a continuum of ﬁrms in each sector that are competitive
in output and factor markets. Since technologies exhibit constant returns to scale proﬁts are
zero and ﬁrm ownership in unimportant.
Skilled labor sector: Technology in the sector Y uses only skilled labor. The production process
in this sector is represented by:
Y = ALS, A > 0, (1)
5Diﬀerently, Galor and Moav (2006) show that due to complementarity between physical and human capital
in production, capitalists might have incentives to support public education which beneﬁts directly the working
class.
6Home production has been explicitly treated in general equilibrium models in the study of business cycles
(e.g., Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991), Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991), and R´ ıos-Rull (1993)), and
economic development (e.g., Parente, Rogerson, and Wright (2000) and Greenwood, J. and A. Seshadri (2005)).
7This does not mean that our view is superior to the existing literature. We also do not quantify how important
is the role of cheap home goods in the persistency of income inequality. Our analysis is qualitative.
8Another way to set this is to assume that there are two periods during adulthood. One when adults (young
adulthood) choose only their family size, and another (old adulthood) when they make the other relevant decisions.Cheap Home Goods and Persistent Inequality 4
where LS corresponds to the amount of skilled labor units employed in the production of good
Y , and A is a positive productive factor.
Unskilled labor sector: Good Z can be produced in the market or at home, where all agents
have the same productivity. The market technology for good Z is represented by
ZM = δBLM, δ ∈ (0,1), A > B > 0, (2)
where LM corresponds to hours employed by the representative ﬁrm in the production of good
Z, and B is a positive constant.
Agents are more productive at home in the production of good Z than in the market, such
that
ZH = BLH, A > B > 0. (3)
The units of Z produced at home, however, cannot be transferred, or used to buy market
consumption goods.
Let good Y be the numerarie, q be the market price of good Z, and wU and wS be the
unskilled and skilled wage. All prices are in terms of the consumption good Y . Proﬁt maxi-
mization implies that wS = A, and wU
q ≥ δB, with equality if ZM > 0. Given the linearity of
the production functions, we just need one equilibrium market condition to deﬁne wU and then
q. Notice that given that skilled agents can also work in the unskilled sector, it implies that the
skilled wage cannot be lower than the unskilled wage.
Households:
Let Vnh(Ω) denotes the utility of an adult with n children and skill h and let Ω be the
aggregate state of the economy, which is explained below. Parents care about the consumption
of goods Y and Z, and about the average discounted utility of their children, which is discounted
by γ ∈ (0,1). Let c and z be the household consumption of good Y and Z, respectively. Let
a be the time spent at home in the production of good Z. The problem of an adult with n
children and skill h is represented by
Vnh(Ω) = max
e,c,zM,a
{lnc + αlnz + γ[e max
n∈{G,P}




c + q(Ω)zM + φen ≤ wh(Ω)(1 − a), (5)
z = zM + Ba + Bn(1 − e)l, (6)
e ∈ {0,1},c ≥ 0,zM ≥ 0,a ∈ [0,1],h = U,S. (7)
It is important to highlight that fertility n does not enter directly into the utility function. As
in Doepke and Zilibotti (2005), parents care only about the average utility of their children.
This implies that they will have a large family size only if they expect to send their children
to work. On the other hand, since education is costly, parents have a small family only if they
expect to send their children to school. Therefore, the quantity-quality tradeoﬀ here is: the
higher present consumption if their children work versus the higher future average utility if their
children attend school.
The budget constraint (equation (5)) states that the sum of expenditures on consumption
of good Y and good Z, and on education costs cannot exceed labor income. Equation (6) states
that good z can be bought in the market or can be produced at home. The last term on the
right hand side of (6) implies that children who do not go to school help their parents in the
production of good z at home. Equation (7) shows the constraints on choice variables. Notice
that education is a non-convex choice.Cheap Home Goods and Persistent Inequality 5
Assume that initially there is a number XGU0 of unskilled parents with a large family size
and a number XPS0 of skilled parents with a small family size. Therefore, initially there is
neither unskilled parents with a small family size nor skilled parents with a large family size.
In fact, as we will show, it is optimal for unskilled parents and skilled parents to choose a large
and a small family size, respectively.
Assumption 1: α > lG.
Assumption 1 deﬁnes an upper bound on the quantity of good Z produced by children.
Proposition 1 Consider the problem of an unskilled parent, h = U, with a large family size,
n = G. Under assumption 1:
i. zM
GU = 0 and aGU > 0.
Proof. See appendix A
Proposition 1 suggests that unskilled parents with a large family size do not buy good
Z in the market. They instead produce it at home. Therefore, unskilled parents work in
the market either to buy consumption good Y or/and to pay for their children’s education.
Assumption 1 guarantees that unskilled parents with working children will also work at home.
If the productivity of their children were too high (lG > α) then only their children will produce
good Z at home.
In order to investigate the problem of skilled parents, let’s assume that education costs are
small relatively to the skilled market wage. Otherwise, there will be no skilled agents in the
economy.
Assumption 2 A > φP.
Proposition 2 Consider the problem of a skilled parent, h = S, with a small family size,
n = P. It can be show that under assumption 2.
i. If q(Ω) < A
B, then aPS = 0, zM
PS > 0. Otherwise, aPS > 0, zM
PS = 0.
ii. If eGU = 1, then ePS = 1.
Proof. See appendix B
Item (i) implies that if the market price of good Z is small relatively to the skilled wage,
i.e., if q(Ω) < wS
B = A
B, then skilled parents will not produce good Z at home, they will instead
buy it in the market. Therefore, in order to have market demand for good Z its price cannot
be “too” high. Otherwise skilled agents will produce it at home. Notice that this also implies
an upper bound for the unskilled wage, wU(Ω) < δwS. The intuition is straightforward: If
the price of good Z is low enough, it is optimal for skilled agents to specialize in the market
production of good Y and do not produce good Z at home. Item (ii) suggests that if unskilled
parents educate their children, then it is also optimal for skilled agents to educate their children.
Therefore, in order to have production of good Y skilled agents must educate their children.
Recall that XGU0 and XPS0 are the initially number of unskilled agents with a large family size
and skilled agents with a small family size, respectively. The number of unskilled agents and
the number of skilled agents evolve according to:
X0
GU = GXGU(1 − eGU), (8)
X0
PS = PXPS + GXGUeGU. (9)Cheap Home Goods and Persistent Inequality 6
The state variable, Ω, that describes the position of the economy in each period of time cor-
responds to the ratio of unskilled and skilled workers, Ω = XGU
XPS . As we will show shortly, the
unskilled wage depends negatively on Ω. The skill wage premium ( wS
wU(Ω)), on the other hand,
depends positively on the state variable. Therefore, we can view Ω as a measure of income













Given the law of motion of the aggregate state variable, we deﬁne the recursive competitive
equilibrium as follows.
Deﬁnition: A Recursive Competitive Equilibrium for this economy consists of value functions
Vnh, policy function (enh, cnh, zM
nh, anh), for nh ∈ {GU,PS}, price function (wS, wU, q), and
a law of motion Ω0 = F(Ω) for the aggregate state variable such that
i. Vnh satisfy Bellman equation (4) and enh, cnh, zM
nh, anh are the associated policy functions.
ii. wS = A and wU
q ≥ δB. Moreover, good Y market clears
XGUcGU + XPScPS + φGXGUeGU + φPXPSePS = AXPS(1 − aPS) (11)
iii. Law of motion F(Ω) satisﬁes equation (10).
The equilibrium condition (11) states that the demand for good Y should be equal to
the supply of good Y . The demand consists of total consumption of good Y and education
expenditures by skilled and unskilled households. Recall that education costs are in terms of
good Y .
3 Equilibrium Analysis
Now let’s analyze the equilibrium with ﬁxed policies. There might be two equilibria for this
economy:9
i. Just skilled parents educate their children.
ii. Skilled and unskilled parents educate their children.
Just skilled parents educate their children: Let’s consider the ﬁrst equilibrium in which only
skilled parents educate their children. See appendix C, part 1, for a fully characterization of
this equilibrium path. In this equilibrium, there will be market production for good Z in all
periods. Skilled workers will specialize in the production of good Y , devoting a zero fraction of
their time endowment to the home production of good Z. They will instead buy good Z in the





The ratio of unskilled to skilled workers will grow at rate G
P − 1 > 0, i.e., Ω0 = G
P Ω. Therefore,
at some time period t ≥ 0, the measure of unskilled agents relatively to skilled agents will be
9Notice that item (ii) of proposition 2 rules out the equilibrium in which only unskilled parents educate their
children.
10Appendix C, part 1, shows that we can deﬁne a φG < w
∗
U, such that for all wU(Ω) < w
∗
U it is optimal for an
unskilled parent to not educate their children when all other unskilled parents are not sending their children to
school. For some parameter values, we can also guarantee that w
∗
U is ﬁnite and wU(Ω) < w
∗
U < δwS.Cheap Home Goods and Persistent Inequality 7




(1+α), such that wU(Ω0) = P
GwU(Ω). Since G > P,
we have that the skill wage premium ( wS
wU(Ω)) and therefore inequality will increase over time.
The market price of good Z will, on the other hand, decrease over time. Inequality will be
persistent for two reasons: (i) Unskilled parents will have a larger family size than unskilled
agents; and (ii) they will not educate their descendants, increasing therefore the skill wage
premium. Notice that if parents have the same family size (G = P), then inequality will still be
persistent, but the skilled wage premium would in this case be constant. It can be shown that
the growth rate of output per capita will be lower the higher is the diﬀerential in fertility (G
P )
between unskilled and skilled parents,11 which is consistent to the theory and data presented
by de la Croix and Doepke (2001).
Skilled and unskilled parents educate their children: Let’s consider the second equilibrium in
which both skilled and unskilled agents educate their children. See appendix C, part 2, for a
fully characterization of this equilibrium path. In this case, there will be market production of
good Z only in the ﬁrst period. From the second period on, all agents will be skilled and all
will devote a positive fraction of their time endowment to the home production of good Z. It
can be shown that the initial unskilled wage is:12
wU(Ω) = min{δwS,
α(A − φ(P + ΩG))
Ω
}. (13)
Since from the second period on there is only skilled agents, we have that Ω0 = 0.13 There will
be no inequality among agents and skilled agents will have to work at home in the production of
good Z. From the second period on, output per worker will be constant over time.14 Therefore,
as in Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Galor and Zeira (1993), the initial conditions determine
ﬁnal outcomes.
We now investigate whether it is optimal for skilled parents to erect barriers to the acquisition
of skills.











Then, for every Ω > Ω∗ ∃ a unique ¯ φ(Ω) ∈ [0, A
P+
(1+α)
α ΩG), such that:
i. φ < ¯ φ(Ω) ⇒ eGU = 1.
ii. φ > ¯ φ(Ω) ⇒ eGU = 0.
Proof. See appendix D
Item (i) and (ii) from proposition 3 and ﬁgure 1 illustrate the decision of unskilled parents
to educate or not their children. They show that it is optimal for all unskilled parents to send
11Gross domestic output (GDP) per worker will be Y + q(Ω)Z




1+Ω. Notice that here, as
in the National Accounts, we are considering only the value of market production. If we also consider the value









decreases over time. We, however, could have assumed that the productivity factors (A and B) and education
costs φ are all increasing at some exogenous rate µ, and then output would grow over time as in the standard
neoclassical growth model. This, however, would not add any new insights in our analysis.
12Appendix C, part 2, shows that depending on parameter values there exists a φG < w
•
U < δwS, such that
for all wU(Ω) > w
•
U it is optimal for an unskilled parents to send their children to school when all other parents
are also sending their children to acquire skills.





14Output per worker in the initial period is Y + q(Ω)Z




1+Ω, while in the second period on
it will be Y =
A+αφP
1+α .Cheap Home Goods and Persistent Inequality 8
their children to school only if the cost of education is suﬃcient small (φ < ¯ φ(Ω)). From the
point of view of a parent it is important to highlight that even if the direct cost of education is
zero (φ = 0), there still exists an opportunity cost (i.e., the foregone income from child labor) of
sending their children to school.15 This opportunity cost increases with the child labor relative
productivity lG. In addition, the higher the fertility diﬀerential (G
P ), the higher is the incentive
for unskilled parents to educate their children. This is because, if they do not educate their
children, then the equilibrium unskilled wage evolves according to wU(Ω0) = P
GwU(Ω),16 and
future unskilled market income will decrease over time, as well as the future utility of their
descendants.









VGU( Ω) =m ax{V 0
GU( Ω) , V 1
GU( Ω) }
For skilled parents there are two opposing eﬀects associated with an increase in education
costs φ. First, a higher direct cost of education implies a lower present consumption and
therefore lower present utility. On the other hand, a higher education cost implies a higher
demand for good Y , and therefore an increase in the skill wage premium wS
wU(Ω). This allows
skilled agents to purchase a higher amount of good Z in the market. When unskilled agents
do not send their children to school (φ > ¯ φ(Ω)), the eﬀect on the skilled wage premium is
small, and the value function associated with a skilled parent V 1
PS(Ω) is continuous and strictly
decreasing in φ ∈ (¯ φ(Ω), A
P ).
When unskilled parents decide to send their children to school (φ < ¯ φ(Ω)) this reinforces
the increase in the demand for good Y and therefore the eﬀect of φ on the skill wage premium.
This eﬀect is stronger when inequality (Ω) is high. This eﬀect will, however, be present only
in the ﬁrst period. From the second period on, there will be only skilled agents and for future
generations, utility will be strictly decreasing with education costs φ. Therefore, it can be
shown that, in an equilibrium when both skilled and unskilled parents send their children to
acquire skills, there exists a suﬃcient large altruism factor γ, such that the value function
of skilled parents V
1,a0>0
PS (Ω) is continuous and strictly decreasing with φ ∈ [0, ¯ φ(Ω)) where
¯ φ(Ω) ∈ [0, A
P+
(1+α)
α ΩG). Deﬁne ¯ φ(Ω)max = A
P+
(1+α)
α ΩG. It can be shown that if inequality is
suﬃciently high, skilled agents strictly prefer an education cost φ = ¯ φ(Ω)max > 0, than a policy
in which the acquisition of skill is freely provided (φ = 0).
15This explains the ﬁrst term on the right hand side of (14).
16This explains the second term on the right hand side of (14).Cheap Home Goods and Persistent Inequality 9















Then, for any Ω > max{Ω∗,Ω∗∗} skilled agents strictly prefer education costs φ = ¯ φ(Ω)max than
φ = 0.
Proof. See appendix D
Figure 2 describes well proposition 4. It shows that the value function of skilled parents is
not necessarily continuous at ¯ φ(Ω). In addition, skilled parents might prefer an education cost
φ > ¯ φ(Ω), such that unskilled parents do not educate their children than a lower education cost
φ < ¯ φ(Ω), such that unskilled parents send their children to acquire skills. If φ < ¯ φ(Ω), then
future generations of skilled parents will have to work at home in the production of good Z,
since future market prices of good Z will be at its maximum value (δwS) and it is cheaper to
produce good Z at home. This implies that depending on the level of inequality it is a vested
interest of skilled agents to erect barriers to the acquisition of skills.









Consider, for instance, that multilateral agencies provide ﬁnancial aids for developing coun-
tries to improve their public education systems. These ﬁnancial aids might help to institute a
free, compulsory education or might be in a form of subsidies to poor families to educate their
children.17 What proposition 4 and ﬁgure 2 show is that, depending on the level of inequality,
this policy is not necessarily welfare improving under the Pareto criterion. General equilibrium
price adjustments implies that future skill premiums would reduce as the children of unskilled
parents attend schools. In addition, the future price of the “home good” (Z) will increase.
Future skilled agents might have to work at home to produce good Z instead of buying it in the
market. Since parents value the future utility of their children, the welfare of skilled parents
might be reduced.18
17Notice that this policy does not require tax increases.
18Notice that with this policy the skill wage premium in the ﬁrst period might increase, since, as argued before,
there is a higher demand for good Y . This is because education costs φ is in terms of the consumption good Y .
In addition, skilled parents do not have to work at home in the period. They can still buy it in the market.Cheap Home Goods and Persistent Inequality 10
Observe, however, that this policy is Pareto improving in a model similar to the one presented
by Galor and Zeira (1993).19 In their model, parents utility depends on the size of bequest and
not on their oﬀsprings’ utility. The policy analyzed above is, however, also Pareto improving in
the Galor and Zeira model even if parents utility depends on the utility of their children. The
reason is that as long as the skilled current and future wages do not change, the policy will be
Pareto improving, even though the skilled wage premium is reduced. There is no “home good”
in the Galor and Zeira model. In our model, a reduced skilled wage premium implies a higher
market price of good Z.
4 Extensions
In order to derive the main results of the last section, the model was kept at a very simple level.
There are, however, some extensions that would enrich some of our results. Firstly, we abstract
from capital accumulation. Capital accumulation is, however, key in the analysis of economic
development. If, for instance, the skilled labor is more complementary to capital than the
unskilled one, then the skilled wage premium would increase with capital accumulation. Skilled
agents would therefore have an additional motive to block policies that provide education at
low costs. Reinforcing some of our results.
We also abstract from improvements in technology in the market and at home. Improve-
ments in the technology in the “home sector”, such as the introduction and development of
home appliances, that save time in household chores would increase the opportunity cost of
buying the “home good” in the market.20 This would decrease the market price of home goods
and the unskilled wage. Unskilled parents will have higher incentives to send their children to
school, since their future income will be lower.
As in Doepke and Zilibotti (2005), the cost of acquiring skills is exogenous in our model
economy. The education cost φ per child could be endogenized as, for instance, in de la Croix
and Doepke (2001), where this cost is deﬁned in units of time of teachers who have the average
human capital in the population. For our purpose, however, it is important to consider not only
the direct cost of acquiring skills, but also some indirect costs, such as availability of schools
and entrance policies in universities. Sokoloﬀ and Engerman (2000: 230) states that “where
there existed elites who were sharply diﬀerentiated from the rest of the population on the basis of
wealth, human capital, and political inﬂuence, they seem to have used their standing to restrict
competition.”
Finally, the political power is also not endogenous in our model (see, for instance, Bour-
guignon, F. and T. Verdier (2000)). Notice that if the political power depends on the vote of
the median agent, then countries would improve their public education system and inequality
will decrease. However, if the political power is in the elite’s hands, then improvements in the
public education system will be slow and inequality will persist.
Though all extensions are important to understand the evolution of policies and institutions,
they are not key to show how some cheap home goods beneﬁts part of the society and why some
individuals might block policies that are beneﬁcial for aggregate growth and development.21
19In the model described by Doepke (2004), this policy is also not Pareto improving. In his model there is only
one good which can be produced with skilled or unskilled labor with just one technology (i.e., Y = F(LS,LU)).
Changes in the supply of unskilled labor will then aﬀect the skilled wage. Notice, however, that in Doepke’s
model the unskilled wage might be higher than the skilled one.
20This is emphasized by Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu (2005) in their model of female labor force
participation.
21Notice that the extensions suggested are important to understand why some countries started to invest in
their public education, while others have a poor education system. For instance, Alston and Ferri (1993) show
that the end of Paternalism in the U.S. South is associated to the mechanization of the cotton harvest in the
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5 Concluding Remarks
There exists a large literature which shows that public education is favorable for growth because
it increases the level of human capital and at the same time it tends to produce a more even
income distribution.22 More egalitarian societies are also associated with less social conﬂicts
and individuals have a lower tendency to report themselves happy when inequality is high (e.g.,
Alesina, DiTella, and MacCulloch (2004)). Therefore it is important to study the reasons of why
countries do not adopt and implement a compulsory and eﬃcient public educational system.
It might be that education is related to social status and therefore the elite might oppose the
development of a strong public education system or any reform that would threat their political
power. We contribute to this literature by showing that one of this social status might be the
specialization of skilled workers in high-paid jobs and the abundance of unskilled workers in
the production of some cheap “home goods” in the market, such as painting and cleaning a
house, babysitting and/or cooking. Unskilled workers will, however, have to work at home and
in the market with low-paid jobs to acquire “market goods”. We emphasize the role of general
equilibrium price adjustments to show why the elite might erect barriers to policies that improve
the public education system. The higher the unskilled to skilled labor ratio, the lower is the
relative price of the “home good”. We show that, depending on the level of inequality, the elite
might oppose policies that improve the education system even if there is no tax increases to
ﬁnance such policies.
We conclude by exposing some empirical narratives consistent to our results. Sokoloﬀ and
Engerman (2000) show how the “elite” of some countries protected their status quo by investing
poorly in primary schooling or/and by erecting barriers in the right to vote and other privileges.
According to them, the degree of political power of elites were indeed associated to the inequality
in wealth and human capital in the society. Recently Easterly (2005), using cross-countries
data, shows that not only inequality cause underdevelopment, but it is also a signiﬁcant and
independent barrier to high schooling. In his study of inequality and development, Mancur
Olson (1982: 162-163) exempliﬁes well how skilled agents might erect barriers to the acquisition
of skills: “...The mine owners and management needed labor and naturally preferred to secure
it at low wages rather than high wages. Since Africans had few other opportunities outside
the traditional sector of African society, they were often available at low wages... European
workers were employed in the mines mainly as foreman and skilled and semi-skilled laborers.
It was far clear that the far-cheaper African laborers could at very little cost soon be taught the
semi-skilled jobs and the employers naturally coveted the savings in labor cost that this would
bring.” However, the Mines and Work Acts of 1911 and 1926 (“Colour Bar Acts”) constrained
employers in their use of African labor in semi-skilled and skilled jobs. “The denial of various
skilled and semi-skilled jobs to Africans not only raised the wages of the European workers, but
it also crowded more labor into areas that remained open to Africans, making the wages there
lower than they would otherwise be.” Another empirical evidence is the paternalism, a system
of social control in the U.S. South that emerged in the late 19th century and characterized the
American South in the ﬁrst half of the 20th century. Alston and Ferri (1993) argue that the
paternalism23 comprised a variety of laws and practices, such as low level of expenditure on
education and the exclusion of blacks and poor whites from the electoral process. Landowners
also prevented the appearance of public welfare programs that could substitute this system of
social control until the mechanization of the cotton harvest in the 1950’s.
22See Galor and Zeira (1993). For a recent reference, see Doepke (2004).
23They deﬁne it as an implicit contract in which workers trade “dependable” labor services in exchange for
housing, credit and protection.Cheap Home Goods and Persistent Inequality 12
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A Unskilled Households
Consider the problem of a unskilled household with a large family size.
VGU(Ω) = max
e∈{0,1},zM,a
{ln(wU(Ω)(1 − a) − q(Ω)zM − φeG) + αln(zM + Ba + BlG(1 − e))
+ γ[e max
n∈{G,P}
VnS(Ω0) + (1 − e) max
n∈{G,P}
VnU(Ω0)]}.









≤ 0, a ≥ 0,
∂VGU
∂a








≤ 0, zM ≥ 0,
∂VGU
∂zM zM = 0. (17)
Notice that if zM > 0 this implies that
wU(Ω)
q(Ω) ≥ B, which is a contradiction since
wU(Ω)
q(Ω) = δB
and δ ∈ (0,1). This implies that zM
GU = 0 and
aGU = max{0,
wU(Ω)(α − lG(1 − e)) − αφeG
wU(Ω)(1 + α)
}.
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and
V 0
GU(Ω) = ln(wU(Ω)(1 − a0
U)) + αln(Ba0
U + BlG) + γ max
n∈{G,P}
VnU(Ω0).








) + γ max
n∈{G,P}
VnU(Ω0).






Then, as long as education costs are not too high relative to the unskilled wage, i.e., wU(Ω) >
φG, a1








) + γ max
n∈{G,P}
VnS(Ω0).
Unskilled agents send their children to school if and if
V 1
GU(Ω) − V 0
GU(Ω) > 0.
This requires that
γ[maxn∈{G,P} VnS(Ω0) − maxn∈{G,P} VnU(Ω0)] >
ln(
wU(Ω)(1+lG)
1+α ) + αln(
Bα(1+lG)
1+α ) − [ln(
wU(Ω)−φG












B Skilled Households with Small Family
Now let’s consider the problem of a skilled parent with a small family size:
VPS(Ω) = max
e∈{0,1},zM,a
{ln(wS(Ω)(1 − a) − q(Ω)zM − φeP) + αln(zM + Ba + BlP(1 − e))
+ γ[e max
n∈{G,P}
VnS(Ω0) + (1 − e) max
n∈{G,P}
VnU(Ω0)]}.









≤ 0, a ≥ 0,
∂VPS
∂a








≤ 0, zM ≥ 0,
∂VPS
∂zM zM = 0. (20)
It is straightforward to show that:
i. When q(Ω) < A
B, then a = 0, zM > 0.
ii. When q(Ω) = A
B, then a > 0, zM > 0.
iii. When q(Ω) > A
B, then a > 0, zM = 0.Cheap Home Goods and Persistent Inequality 15
Therefore, in order to have market demand for good Z its price cannot be “too” high.
Otherwise agents will produce good Z at home.
Assumption 2 states that education cost is not “too” high relatively to the skilled wage, i.e.,
wS = A > φP. Otherwise, skilled parents will never educate their children. Let’s ﬁrst assume
that there is initially market production of good Z, therefore we are under case 1 above. We














) + γ max
n∈{G,P}
VnS(Ω0).














) + γ max
n∈{G,P}
VnU(Ω0).
Now, let’s consider case (iii). We have that aPS > 0 and zM
PS = 0. If ePS = 1, then
V
1,a>0






) + γ max
n∈{G,P}
VnS(Ω0).
Notice that under case (iii) there exists no market demand for good Z. Let’s assume initially
that there is market production for good Z, and the economy is under case (i). In this case,
skilled parents educate their children if
V 1
PS(Ω) − V 0
PS(Ω) > 0.
This requires that
γ[maxn∈{G,P} VnS(Ω0) − maxn∈{G,P} VnU(Ω0)] >
ln(
wS+q(Ω)BlP
1+α ) + αln(
α(wS+qBlP)
(1+α)q(Ω) ) − [ln(
wS−φP












In order to prove that eGU = 1 implies ePS = 1 it is suﬃcient to show that the right hand side















Recall that q(Ω) =
wU(Ω)







Rearranging the above equation yields
wU(Ω)[δwSG − wU(Ω)P]l + δφ[wSG − wU(Ω)P] + wU(Ω)GlPφ[1 − δ] > 0,
which is clearly positive, since wU(Ω) < δwS, G > P, and δ ∈ (0,1).Cheap Home Goods and Persistent Inequality 16
C Characterization of the Steady State
We can have the following equilibrium paths:
Part 1: Just skilled parents educate their children: Let’s characterize the ﬁrst equilibrium in
which just skilled parents educate their children. In this case there will be market production








) + γ max
n∈{G,P}
VnS(Ω0).
In this equilibrium in which skilled agents choose a small family size, educate their children and















Unskilled parents will not educate their children and will also not by good Z in the market.
Thus
V 0
GU(Ω) = ln(wU(Ω)(1 − a0
U)) + αln(Ba0
U + BlG) + γ max
n∈{G,P}
VnU(Ω0).
Since unskilled parents will not send their children to school they will not pay the cost associated
to education and will receive income from child labor. The family size enters positively in the












In order to fully characterize the equilibrium it remains to ﬁnd equilibrium prices. We know
that wS = A and
wU(Ω)
q(Ω) = δB. Using the equilibrium in the goods market, we can show that
XGU
XPS






as long as wU(Ω) < δwS. Recall that Ω0 = G
P Ω, and the initial state Ω0 is given. It is also
important to show that if a parent deviates from its optimal choice, then he gets a lower utility.
Consider ﬁrst an unskilled parent that chooses to deviate from this equilibrium. This parent will
send their children to school when all other unskilled parents are not educating their children.
Future descendants choose to have a small family size and educate their children. The utility
of this parent is:










1+α ) + αln(
α(wS−φP)





Therefore, as long as
V 0
GU(Ω) − ˜ VGU(Ω) ≥ 0,
24Notice that the size of the family enters negatively because agents have to pay education costs. They should
also foregone the income from child labor.Cheap Home Goods and Persistent Inequality 17
it is optimal for an unskilled parent to not send their children to school when all other unskilled
parents are not educating their children. It can be shown that this condition is satisﬁed when
(1 + α)ln(wU(Ω)) − (1 − γ)(1 + α)ln(wU(Ω) − φG) > (24)







Since γ ∈ (0,1) we have that the left hand side (LHS) of (24) is always positive. Moreover,
it is continuous in wU(Ω) > φG and it goes to inﬁnity as wU(Ω) → φG. The LHS of (24) is
also decreasing with wU(Ω) as long as
wU(Ω)
wU(Ω)−φG > 1
1−γ. 25 On the other hand, the right hand
side (RHS) of (24) is independent of wU(Ω). Therefore, we can deﬁne a w∗
U such that for any
wU(Ω) < w∗
U, it is optimal for unskilled parents to not educate their children. Observe that the
RHS of (24) might be a negative number. In this case, for any wU(Ω) < δwS it is optimal for
unskilled agents to not educate their children. However, we can choose parameter values such
that not only the RHS is positive, but we are under the interesting case where φG < w∗
U < δwS.
Now, consider a skilled parent that choose to not educate their children when all skilled
parents are sending their descendants to school. Future descendants choose to have a large
family size and do not educate their children. The utility of this parent is



















Therefore, as long as V 1
PS(Ω) − ˜ VPS(Ω) > 0, it is optimal for a skilled parent to educate their
children when all other skilled parents are also sending their children to school and unskilled
parents are not educating their children. This condition is satisﬁed when







(1 − γ)(1 + α)ln(wS +
wU(Ω)
δ
lP) + γ(1 + α)ln(wU(Ω)).
The LHS of (25) is independent of wU(Ω), while the RHS is continuous and increasing in wU(Ω).
Moreover, as wU(Ω) → 0 the LHS → −∞, and when wU(Ω) → ∞, then the LHS → ∞.
Therefore, there exists a w∗∗
U > 0, such that for any wU(Ω) < w∗∗
U , it is optimal for skilled
parents to educate their children. Deﬁne ¯ wU = min{w∗
U,w∗∗
U }. This implies that for any
wU(Ω) ≤ ¯ wU it is optimal for unskilled parents to not send their children to school and it is
optimal for skilled parents to educate their children.
Part 2: Skilled and unskilled parents educate their children: Now, let’s characterize the equi-
librium when skilled and unskilled parents educate their children. In this equilibrium there is
market production of good Z only in the ﬁrst period. The value function of a skilled worker






1+α ) + αln(αB) − γαlnwS
1 − γ
+ αlnδ − αlnwU(Ω). (26)
Unskilled agents with a large family size will educate their children. Their descendants will
then choose a small family size and will also educate their children. The value function of an
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unskilled parent with a large family size is:
V 1










1+α ) − αlnwS
1 − γ
.
Now, it is important to show that individual deviations from the optimal policy yield a lower
payoﬀ. Given item (ii) of proposition 2 it is suﬃcient to show only the condition that guarantees
that it is optimal for unskilled parents to educate their children. Suppose that an unskilled
parent decides to not educate their children when all other parents (skilled and unskilled) are
sending their descendants to attend school. There are two possibilities: their descendants choose
to educate or not their children. Notice, however, that in the next period, their children will be
the only unskilled agents in the economy. If they are a small measure of the total population,
then the unskilled wage will be at its maximum value,26 wU(Ω0) = δwS. Under the interesting
case, where w∗
U < δwS, their descendants will choose to educate their children. Then, the value
associated with this deviation is:
ˆ VGU(Ω) = (1 + α)ln(
1 + lG
1 + α

















As long as V 1
GU(Ω)− ˆ VGU(Ω) > 0 it is optimal for unskilled parents send their children to school




) < (1 + α)ln(wS − φP) − (1 + α)ln(1 + lG) − (28)
γ[(1 + α)ln(δwS − φG) − αlnδ].
The LHS of (28) is continuous and decreasing in wU(Ω). Moreover, when wU(Ω) → φG, then
the LHS → ∞, and when wU(Ω) → ∞, then the LHS → 0. Therefore, as long as the RHS is
positive, there exists a w•
U, such that for any wU(Ω) > w•
U, condition (28) is satisﬁed.
D Main Results


















Notice that V 0
GU(Ω) is clearly continuous in φ ∈ [0, A










26The next period state variable will be Ω
0 =
G






















The equilibrium value function when unskilled parents educate their children is:
V 1






− αlnwU(Ω) + γ
(1 + α)ln(
wS−φP





α(A − φ(P + ΩG))
Ω
.
The value function V 1

















(1 − γ)(A − φP)
< 0.























(1 + α)ln(1 + α).
Condition (14) guarantees that limφ→0 V 1





proves item (i) and item (ii) of proposition 3.








) + γ max
n∈{G,P}
VnS(Ω0).
If φ ∈ (¯ φ(Ω), A
P ) and ¯ φ(Ω) ∈ [0, A
P+
(1+α)
α ΩG), then unskilled parents will not educate their















with wS = A, q(Ω) =
wU(Ω)
δB and wU(Ω) =
α(A−φP)
Ω(1+lG) . It is straightforward to show that V 1
PS(Ω)

















If φ ∈ [0, ¯ φ(Ω)), then unskilled parents will educate their children and there exists market







1+α ) + αln(αB) − γαlnwS
1 − γ
+ αlnδ − αlnwU(Ω),Cheap Home Goods and Persistent Inequality 20














A − φ(P + ΩG)
.












Notice that if φ = 0 and Ω > Ω∗, then
V
1,a0>0
















Recall that ¯ φ(Ω) ∈ [0, A
P+
(1+α)
α ΩG). Deﬁne ¯ φ(Ω)max = A
P+
(1+α)
α ΩG. If φ = ¯ φ(Ω)max and Ω > Ω∗,
then unskilled parents will not educate their children and
V 1










ln(δBΩ(1 + lG)) − ...
1 + α
1 − γ
ln(1 + α) +
αγ




It can be shown that V 1
PS(Ω,φ = ¯ φ(Ω)max) > V
1,a0>0














The LHS of (29) is continuous and increasing in Ω > 0. Moreover, as Ω → 0, then LHS → −∞
and as Ω → ∞, then LHS → ∞. On the other hand, the RHS of (29) is continuous and
decreasing in Ω > 0. In addition, as Ω → 0, then RHS → ∞ and as Ω → ∞, then LHS → 0.
Therefore, there exists an Ω∗∗ > 0, such that if Ω > max{Ω∗∗,Ω∗}, then skilled agents strictly
prefer an education cost φ = ¯ φ(Ω)max than a zero education cost (φ = 0).